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Analyzing the stock…
70
Gathering technical, fundamental, and market data — a few seconds
Consumer Discretionary · ·
$294.20
▼ $3.45 (-1.2%)
Market data updated: 09/20 03:40 AM
Fundamentals updated: 09/19/2026
News analyzed: 09/20/2026
Market Cap
$9.73B
Day Range
$293.50 - $298.23
52-Week Range
$282.00 - $442.35
Beta
—
Next Earnings
13.10.2026
Support
$293.37
Resistance
$372.16
DPZ is a stock from the Consumer Cyclical sector — Retail, automotive, and leisure — demand rises and falls with economic sentiment and consumers' disposable income.
-31.6% (1Y)
Strengths: 9/32 factors positiveRisk: Medium
This score and all analysis on this page are for informational and educational purposes only and do not constitute investment advice. Read the full disclaimer
Weighted: Technical 25% · Fundamental 20% · Growth 15% · Valuation 15% · News 10% · Quality 10% · Risk 5%
Overall Score
🟡 Mixed
Technical Trend
🔴 Bearish
Insiders
🔴 Bearish
Computed directly from the same signals behind the score above — not AI-generated.
Biggest positive driver
DCF Fair Value
Estimated fair value: $328.58 vs. price $294.20 (+11.7%)
Fair Value
Biggest negative driver
Calmar Ratio (return vs. drawdown)
Calmar: -0.18 (3y annualized return -8.4% / max drawdown 47.0%)
Risk
What to watch next
When today echoes the past.
76/100
Similarity
15
Historical Matches
88/100
Analog Quality
+3.0%
Median 40D Outcome
65/100
Pattern Consistency
🟢 Bullish
47%
+5.9% … +9.8%
🟡 Base
20%
+0.3% … +0.5%
🔴 Bearish
33%
-7.6% … -4.3%
Typical timeframe (based on real historical rates clearing a 60% bar): 5 trading days.
📌 Bottom line: Out of 15 similar historical cases for this stock, 47% (95% CI 25%–70%) saw the stock rise within 20 trading days, with a median gain of +0.5%.
Echo #1 — Oversold Reversal
6 occurrence(s) · 50% historical success
Historical outcome rate is not a probability — it's what happened in this specific historical sample, with a 95% confidence range.
| Horizon | Positive rate (95% CI) | Median | 25th–75th pct | Baseline median |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5D | 67% (42%–85%) | +2.6% | -0.3% … +3.4% | +0.1% |
| 10D | 60% (36%–80%) | +2.1% | -1.7% … +4.0% | +0.3% |
| 20D | 47% (25%–70%) | +0.5% | -4.0% … +7.1% | +0.7% |
| 40D | 53% (30%–75%) | +3.0% | -6.5% … +14.7% | +1.2% |
| 60D | 60% (36%–80%) | +4.7% | -1.1% … +11.2% | +1.3% |
Sample size: 15 analogs, each at least 10 trading days apart (no double-counted overlapping events).
What happened after each historical match (20-day return)
| Date | Similarity | Regime | 20D outcome | 60D outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-27 | 76/100 | Downtrend | -3.7% | -17.4% |
| 2026-05-05 | 75/100 | Downtrend | -7.5% | +4.7% |
| 2023-03-02 | 73/100 | ✓ Downtrend | +7.3% | -1.8% |
| 2022-09-07 | 72/100 | ✓ Downtrend | -7.6% | +6.3% |
| 2021-03-05 | 71/100 | ✓ Downtrend | +12.5% | +28.1% |
| 2022-05-05 | 71/100 | Downtrend | +7.7% | +14.5% |
| 2022-03-14 | 68/100 | Downtrend | +0.5% | -0.6% |
| 2018-12-20 | 68/100 | Downtrend | +11.9% | +3.6% |
| 2022-01-27 | 68/100 | Downtrend | +0.1% | -12.0% |
| 2023-01-09 | 68/100 | ✓ Downtrend | +7.0% | -1.6% |
| 2022-04-18 | 68/100 | ✓ Downtrend | -11.3% | +5.2% |
| 2026-05-19 | 67/100 | Downtrend | +0.5% | +10.7% |
| 2017-08-01 | 66/100 | Consolidation | -4.3% | -0.4% |
| 2022-09-29 | 65/100 | Downtrend | +4.8% | +11.6% |
| 2026-06-03 | 63/100 | Downtrend | +1.6% | +14.1% |
Every accepted match is compared to today across 6 domains (price structure, momentum, technical, volatility, volume, relative strength) using z-scored feature distances — no single indicator dominates. Matches within 10 trading days of each other count as one event, not independent evidence. Outcome rates use a Wilson confidence interval (never a raw percentage alone), the mean return is winsorized against extreme outliers, and "Analog Quality" separately captures sample size, data completeness, and regime match — distinct from raw similarity. Relative strength is measured against SPY and against XLY (this stock's sector).
Cross-stock analogs — real other companies, not this stock's own history.
TIME ECHO identifies historical situations that resemble the current market state. Historical outcomes are not guarantees of future performance. Similarity does not imply causation, and results may change as new data becomes available.
🗓️ What Changed This Week
🌱 Building History
We don't have a real data point from a week ago for this stock yet. The weekly comparison will appear once enough history has accumulated.
📊 Score History
52
Today
—
30D
—
90D
—
1Y
🐂🐻 Investment Thesis
🐂 Bull Case
🐻 Bear Case
🔍 What Could Prove This Wrong
This isn't a price-direction forecast — just a synthesis of real, already-computed data, and future conditions that could change the picture.
🧬 STOCK DNA
This stock's profile across 8 real dimensions — a research tool, not a recommendation
Growth
64
Quality
63
Value
62
Momentum
13
Risk
54
Sentiment
86
Fundamental
62
Institutional
0
Stocks with a similar DNA right now
SCANNING DPZ...
Recent media coverage of Domino’s has primarily focused on its financial strategies and market positioning. The company has consistently raised its dividend for over a decade, though analysts highlight concerns about its nearly $5 billion in debt. Despite this, financial firms like UBS have raised their price targets and maintained a "buy" rating, citing strong growth potential. Domino’s China operator also reported robust revenue growth in H1 2026, driven by store expansion. Additionally, Domino’s was noted in broader industry comparisons, contrasting with competitors like Papa John’s amid restructuring efforts.
AI summary based on English-language news sources only — not investment advice.
Everyone's writing about Domino's. News trend score: 86. Reason: 10 of the last 20 articles are positive, versus 4 negative.
News trend analysis is based on article sentiment only, and is not investment advice or financial counsel. Read the full disclaimer
🌡️ Emotional Temperature
29
🎯 Conviction (vs. Emotion)
42
Psychology
94
Fundamentals
62
Technical
13
Valuation
62
The price is holding at a real, documented historical support/resistance level (a 50-day high or low).
A sharp drop, unusual volume, and negative news sentiment all at once — selling pressure that looks emotional.
Extreme momentum, price far above its moving average, and a large premium over fair value.
Price, volume, and sentiment accelerating together — a sign investors are chasing the price, not just following it.
The stock is moving in lockstep with its peers at the same intensity, rather than on its own data.
Price (3M)
-6%
Market Narrative
38
Fundamental Reality
42
Narrative Gap
-4
🔀 Psychology Acceleration
News attention/sentiment is running well ahead of the price move itself.
🧠 StockIQ Psychologist
The market’s dominant herding behavior suggests investors are aligning with peer trends rather than independent analysis. The narrative-reality gap (16) hints at a disconnect where optimism (euphoria score: 16) may outpace tangible fundamentals. Low FOMO (score: 10) and absent panic (score: 4) imply cautious, not impulsive, participation. The key question: *Is this relative outperformance sustainable, or will it revert as broader sentiment shifts?*
Updated: 09/08/2026, 10:23 PM
What could change this?
👥 What the crowd believes
"Domino’s has raised its dividend every year for over a decade... yet the balance sheet carries nearly $5 billion in debt"
"UBS raises price target on Domino’s Pizza to $385 from $375, keeps Buy rating"
"Domino’s Pizza China Operator's H1 growth driven by rapid store expansion and rising transaction volumes"
"Domino’s shares posted a disappointing 13.1% loss over six months, well below the S&P 500’s 12.3% gain"
📈 14D Investor Psychology
Signal classification confidence: High (confidence in the behavioral read, not a price prediction). Describes observable market behavior, not what any individual investor thinks, and is not a buy/sell signal.
🏛️ Investor DNA — Historical Investors
A Historical Strategy Simulation: assuming each investor follows their documented principles, how would they rate this stock today? This is not a prediction of what they would actually do.
🟢 Best match
Samuel Armstrong Nelson — 100/100
🔴 Weakest match
Jesse Livermore — 17/100
🗣️ Why do they disagree?
This stock sparks a sharp divide between methodologies that favor long-term fundamentals and those skeptical of its current positioning. The highest-scoring approaches—Samuel Armstrong Nelson’s cyclical analysis and Edgar Lawrence Smith’s 'buy-and-hold' framework—both see DPZ as undervalued or near a favorable cycle bottom, with Smith even calling it a decade-long candidate. Meanwhile, Charles Mackay’s crowd psychology lens and Morgan Housel’s patient-compounder perspective also lean positive, avoiding signs of mania or hype. However, more cautious voices like Howard Marks and Philip Fisher temper enthusiasm, noting that while the business may be solid, expectations could already be priced in or the quality falls short of their standards. At the other end, value-focused investors like Benjamin Graham and Peter Lynch dismiss it outright, either because it doesn’t meet their strict margin-of-safety criteria or lacks the growth-at-a-reasonable-price dynamic Lynch prioritizes. The contrast highlights a tension between those who see DPZ as a slow-growth, defensive hold and those who view it as overpriced or lacking the edge needed for outperformance.
Samuel Armstrong Nelson
The ABC of Stock Speculation (1903)
🟢 100
Cycle position looks favorable — closer to oversold than overbought
Key question
Is the price overextended, or is there still room to move?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Charles Mackay
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841)
🟢 81
No obvious signs of crowd mania
Key question
Am I being swept along with the crowd, or thinking for myself?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Edgar Lawrence Smith
Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments (1924)
🟢 75
Looks like a real 'buy and hold for a decade' candidate
Key question
Is this a stock I'd be happy to hold and forget about for a decade?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Howard Marks
The Most Important Thing (2011) / Mastering the Market Cycle (2018)
🟢 73
Risk appears reasonably priced — no obvious cycle-timing red flag
Key question
What is the market probably misunderstanding about the risk here?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Morgan Housel
The Psychology of Money (2020)
🟢 67
The kind of quiet compounder a patient holder could actually stick with
Key question
Could I live with this volatility long enough for compounding to actually work?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Jack Schwager
Market Wizards (1989)
🟢 65
A real, disciplined setup with favorable reward/risk
Key question
What's the risk/reward here, and where is my exit point?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Howard Marks (Market Cycle)
Mastering the Market Cycle (2018)
🟡 64
Somewhere in the middle of the cycle
Key question
Where are we in the cycle right now — near a hot extreme, or a cold one?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Benjamin Graham
Security Analysis (1934) / The Intelligent Investor (1949)
🟡 60
Mixed — doesn't clearly pass Graham's tests
Key question
Where is my margin of safety?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Philip Fisher
Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits (1958)
🟡 60
Solid, but not the exceptional quality Fisher looked for
Key question
How exceptional is this business, really?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Walter Bagehot
Lombard Street (1873)
🟡 59
Adequate but not exceptional liquidity
Key question
Does this company have enough liquidity to survive real stress?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Gerald M. Loeb
The Battle for Investment Survival (1935)
🟡 56
Moderate risk to capital
Key question
How much capital could I lose here if I'm wrong?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Benjamin Graham (Enterprising Investor)
The Intelligent Investor (1949) — the Enterprising Investor chapters
🟡 55
Some discount, but not the deep 'net-net' bargain Graham's enterprising bar sets
Key question
Is the stock statistically cheap enough to justify the extra risk?
⚠️ Partial data for this stock — score is less reliable — Data availability: 40%
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Burton Malkiel & John Bogle
A Random Walk Down Wall Street (1973) / The Little Book of Common Sense Investing (2007)
🟡 52
Mixed case — the evidence for picking this stock over an index is not strong
Key question
Do I actually have an edge here, or do I just think I do?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Thorstein Veblen
The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904)
🟡 44
Mixed signal on whether growth translates to real profit
Key question
Is management building real value, or just building itself?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Peter Lynch
One Up on Wall Street (1989)
🔴 29
Doesn't clear Lynch's growth-at-a-reasonable-price bar
Key question
Is the growth worth the price?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Jesse Livermore
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (1923) / How to Trade in Stocks (1940)
🔴 17
Negative trend — against Livermore's core rule of trading with the trend
Key question
What is the price telling me right now?
Fact → Principle → Simulation
Based on the last 300 trading days, calculated from real price data. Click an indicator for details and a chart.
🔴 Most indicators support a downtrend (0 bullish · 10 bearish · 1 neutral)
A market-structure read based purely on real price and volume data — not full classic Wyckoff schematic identification (Phase A-E), but a quantitative analysis of what can reliably be computed: trading ranges, "effort vs. result", volume within the range, and Spring/Upthrust detection.
The stock is in a trading range, but the picture isn't yet clear enough on the likely direction.
Low confidence
$293.37
Range Bottom
$372.16
Range Top
50
Trading Days in Range
The Wyckoff Method, developed by Richard Wyckoff in the early 20th century, reads the balance of supply and demand through price and volume, based on the premise that large investors ("smart money") quietly accumulate shares before rallies and quietly distribute them before declines. The read here is based solely on real price and volume data — full, precise identification of classic Wyckoff patterns (such as Phases A-E) requires human chart-reading experience and judgment, so this is an approximate algorithmic read, not a substitute for professional analysis. This should not be considered investment advice.
Gross Margin
40.0%
Operating Margin
19.3%
Net Margin
12.2%
EBITDA Margin
21.1%
ROE
-15.4%
ROA
35.1%
ROIC
—
EPS
$17.69
Cash
$125.67M
Total Debt
$14.70M
Current Ratio
1.65
Debt/Equity
-0.00
Total dividend per share paid each year, over the last 5 years.
| Ex-Dividend Date | Amount per Share |
|---|---|
| 15.9.2026 | $1.990 |
| 15.6.2026 | $1.990 |
| 14.6.2026 | $1.990 |
| 13.3.2026 | $1.990 |
| 12.3.2026 | $1.990 |
| 15.12.2025 | $1.740 |
| 14.12.2025 | $1.740 |
| 15.9.2025 | $1.740 |
| 14.9.2025 | $1.740 |
| 13.6.2025 | $1.740 |
| 12.6.2025 | $1.740 |
| 14.3.2025 | $1.740 |
How is Fair Value calculated? →
Current Price
$294.20
Estimated Fair Value (DCF)
$328.58
Model estimate — not a price target. Highly sensitive to growth/discount-rate assumptions.
Gap
+11.7%
🟢 Appears cheap relative to estimated value
Year 1 Growth Rate
4.7%
Discount Rate (WACC)
9.0%
Terminal Growth Rate
2.5%
Projection Years
5
| Year | Growth Rate | Projected FCF | Present Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 4.7% | $703.19M | $645.13M |
| 2 | 4.2% | $732.48M | $616.51M |
| 3 | 3.6% | $758.92M | $586.02M |
| 4 | 3.1% | $782.10M | $554.06M |
| 5 | 2.5% | $801.66M | $521.02M |
Base FCF (last actual year)
$671.50M
Terminal Value
$12.64B
Present Value of Terminal Value
$8.22B
Enterprise Value
$11.14B
Net Debt
$-110.97M
Equity Value
$11.25B
*The DCF model is an estimate based on assumptions — not a guaranteed forecast. You can change the assumptions to examine different scenarios.
Book Value per Share
-$113.94
Tangible Book Value per Share (Tangible NAV)
-$114.26
Sentiment based on basic keywords (not AI) — 10 positive, 6 neutral, 4 negative out of the last 20 articles.
Yahoo · 18.9.2026
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Yahoo · 15.9.2026
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Domino's (DPZ) currently has a StockIQ AI score of 52/100, rated "Moderate". The score is a weighted average across up to 7 categories (technical, fundamental, growth, fair value, news, quality, risk), based on real data only.
DPZ currently scores 52/100 (Moderate) across the categories we measure. StockIQ doesn't give buy/sell recommendations — use this as one data point in your own research, not as investment advice.
Per StockIQ's DCF model, DPZ's estimated fair value is $328.58, which is 11.7% above the current price of $294.20. This is one valuation model among several signals in the fair-value category, not a price target.
DPZ's technical score is 13/100, which currently reads as bearish — based on real price/volume signals (moving averages, RSI, MACD, and more), not a prediction of what happens next.
Based on the real signals StockIQ computed: Estimated fair value: $328.58 vs. price $294.20 (+11.7%); Free cash flow growth: 31.2%; Operating margin is stable or improving over time.
Based on the real signals StockIQ computed: Calmar: -0.18 (3y annualized return -8.4% / max drawdown 47.0%); Return on equity (ROE): -15.4% (negative); Price is below the 50-day average.
Yes — DPZ has a real recorded dividend payment history on StockIQ. See the Dividends section on this page for the actual per-share amounts and dates.
Real transactions by officers and insiders, as reported to the SEC on Form 4 — 0 purchases and 10 sales out of the last 25 filings.
| Name | Transaction Type | Date | Shares | Change | Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 1,540 | -1,540 | $322.88 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 3,606 | -3,606 | $320.80 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 290 | -290 | $323.18 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 1,010 | -1,010 | $322.92 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 8,220 | -8,220 | — |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 1,370 | -1,370 | $322.87 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 1,010 | +1,010 | $275.35 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 8,220 | +8,220 | $300.16 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 290 | +290 | $275.35 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 1,370 | -1,370 | — |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 1,540 | +1,540 | $212.52 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 1,161 | -1,161 | $322.84 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 1,540 | -1,540 | — |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 1,010 | -1,010 | — |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 1,370 | +1,370 | $283.68 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 3,453 | -3,453 | $322.01 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 290 | -290 | — |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 17,572 | +8,220 | $300.16 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 13,966 | -3,606 | $320.80 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 10,513 | -3,453 | $322.01 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 10,892 | +1,540 | $212.52 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 10,722 | +1,370 | $283.68 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 10,362 | +1,010 | $275.35 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Exercise of Derivative Securities | 22.7.2026 | 9,642 | +290 | $275.35 |
| GARCIA KELLY E | Open Market Sale | 22.7.2026 | 9,352 | -290 | $323.18 |
Official FINRA data — the number of shares open in short positions, plus daily short-sale activity.
2,899,091 shares short as of 2026-08-31 · vs. 3,175,632 on 2026-07-31
Official biweekly report (FINRA Rule 4560) — no real higher-frequency data exists for this metric.
46.3% of trading volume this week was short selling, vs. 58.4% the prior week
Based on daily short-sale volume (Reg SHO) — a different metric from the open short interest above: this is daily trading volume, not an open position, so it updates weekly rather than biweekly.
Full breakdown of every data type and its source: Data Sources · Methodology